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Abstract
The Bluetooth standard specifies two incompatible wireless
transports: Bluetooth Classic (BT) for high-throughput ser-
vices and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) for very low-power
services. BT and BLE have different security architectures
and threat models, but they use similar security mechanisms.
In particular, pairing enables two devices to establish a long
term key to secure the communication. Two devices have
to pair over BT and BLE to use both transports securely.
Since pairing the same devices two times is considered “user-
unfriendly”, Bluetooth v4.2 introduced Cross-Transport Key
Derivation (CTKD). CTKD allows two devices to pair once,
either over BT or BLE, and generate both BT and BLE long
term keys. Despite CTKD allowing traversal of the security
boundary between BT and BLE, the security implications of
CTKD have not yet been investigated.
We present the first security analysis of CTKD and iden-
tify five cross-transport issues for BT and BLE. These issues
enable, for the first time, exploitation of both BT and BLE
by attacking either transport. Based on the identified issues,
we demonstrate four novel cross-transport attacks resulting
in device impersonation, traffic manipulation, and malicious
session establishment. We refer to them as BLUR attacks, as
they blur the security boundary between BT and BLE. The
BLUR attacks are standard-compliant and therefore apply to
all devices supporting CTKD, regardless of implementation
details. We successfully demonstrate the BLUR attacks on 13
devices with 10 unique Bluetooth chips, and discuss effective
countermeasures. We disclosed our findings and countermea-
sures to the Bluetooth SIG in May 2020.
1 Introduction
Bluetooth is a pervasive wireless technology used by billions
of devices including mobile phones, laptops, headphones, cars,
speakers, medical, and industrial appliances [13]. Bluetooth
is specified in an open standard maintained by the Bluetooth
special interest group (SIG), and the latest version of the
standard is 5.2 [12]. The standard specifies two incompatible
wireless transports, Bluetooth Classic (BT) and Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE). BT is best suited for high-throughput use
cases, such as streaming audio and voice calls, while BLE is
best suited for very low-power use cases such as localization
and monitoring.
As BT and BLE were introduced at different points in time
to address different use cases, the standard maintains separate
security architectures and threat models for BT [12, p. 947]
and BLE [12, p. 1617]. While these security architectures ad-
dress different threat models, they use similar security mech-
anisms, including pairing and secure session establishment.
Pairing enables devices to establish a shared long term key,
and secure session establishment enables paired devices to
establish a secure communication channel by negotiating a
session key that is derived from the pairing long term key.
Devices that support both BT and BLE have to pair twice
to use both transports securely. As pairing the same devices
twice is considered “user-unfriendly“, Bluetooth v4.2 (re-
leased in 2014) introduced Cross-Transport Key Derivation
(CTKD). After pairing on one transport, CTKD allows the
creation of a second long term key for the other transport [12,
p. 1401]. For example, two devices can pair over BT, generate
the BT long term key, and then run CTKD to derive the BLE
long term key (without having to pair over BLE). All major
Bluetooth software stacks (Apple, Linux, Android, and Win-
dows) and hardware providers (Cypress, Intel, Qualcomm,
Broadcom, Apple, Sony, and Bose) implement CTKD. Apple
presented CTKD as a core “always on” Bluetooth feature to
improve usability [42].
CTKD is a promising attack target as it crosses the security
boundary between BT and BLE (i.e., when using CTKD,
pairing over one transport automatically provides security
guarantees for both transports). Despite this fact, the security
of CTKD remains unexplored. For example, the standard does
not include CTKD in the BT and BLE threat models and we
are not aware of any security analyses of CTKD. So far, all
existing attacks focused exclusively on either transport.
We present the first security analysis of CTKD, uncovering
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five security issues. Our issues are novel because they are the
first examples of cross-transport issues for Bluetooth. Based
on those issues, we demonstrate four cross-transport attacks,
enabling impersonation, interception, and manipulation of
traffic between victims, as well as unintended device sessions.
Our attacks are standard-compliant and are thus effective
against all devices that support CTKD. As we are the first
to exploit CTKD and enable BT and BLE cross-transport
exploitation, the attacks are orthogonal to other standard-
compliant attacks on BT and BLE [1, 3, 4, 10, 21, 22, 35, 38].
We name our attacks BLUR attacks, as they blur the security
boundary of BT and BLE.
We implement the BLUR attacks using a widely available
Bluetooth development board connected to a laptop running
Linux and developing custom software based on open-source
tools. This makes reproducing the BLUR attacks simple and
affordable. Our evaluation demonstrates that all tested devices
are vulnerable. We will release our tools to the public after the
responsible disclosure process completes. We use our attack
implementation to evaluate 13 devices, with 10 unique Blue-
tooth chips, from the major hardware and software vendors,
e.g., Broadcom, Cambridge Silicon Radio (CSR), Cypress,
Google, Intel, Linux, Qualcomm, and Windows and represent-
ing all Bluetooth versions that support CTKD (i.e., 4.2, 5.0,
and 5.1) and even a device supporting Bluetooth version 4.1
to which CTKD has been backported.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
• We perform the first security analysis of CTKD (Sec-
tion 3), and show that it enables crossing the security
boundary between BT and BLE. We identify five novel
and very serious issues, which enable the first cross-
transport attacks between BT and BLE.
• We propose four attacks to exploit the issues in CTKD
(Section 4). Our attacks allow impersonation, intercep-
tion, traffic manipulation, and unintended sessions. We
present a low-cost implementation of the attacks based
on a Linux laptop and a Bluetooth development board.
• We confirm that real-world BT and BLE devices are
vulnerable to the BLUR attacks by evaluating our attacks
on 13 unique devices (Section 5). We provide concrete
countermeasures
We disclosed our findings and countermeasures to the Blue-
tooth SIG in May 2020. The Bluetooth SIG acknowledged our
findings and assigned CVE-2020-15802 to the BLUR attacks.
In September 2020, the Bluetooth SIG released unilaterally
released a security notice at https://www.bluetooth.
com/learn-about-bluetooth/bluetooth-technology/
bluetooth-security/blurtooth/.
2 Background
We now compare BT and BLE, and introduce CTKD.
2.1 A Comparison of BT and BLE
BT and BLE are two wireless transports specified in the Blue-
tooth standard. These transports are incompatible (i.e., while
they use the same 2.4 GHz band the physical and link lay-
ers are different) and are designed to complement each other.
BT is used for high-throughput and connection-oriented ser-
vices, such as streaming audio and voice. BLE is used for very
low-power and low-throughput services such as localization
and monitoring. Typically, high-end devices, such as laptops,
smartphones and tablets, provide BT and BLE (in a single
radio chip), while low end devices such as mice, keyboards
and wearables provide either BT or BLE.
BT and BLE have similar security mechanisms but differ-
ent security architectures and threat models. Both transports
provide a pairing mechanism, named Secure Simple Pairing
(SSP), to let two devices establish a long term key. During
pairing, BLE allows negotiating the entropy of the long term
key while BT does not. Both transports provide a secure ses-
sion establishment mechanism to derive a session key from
the long term key and protect the communication. During
session establishment, BT allows negotiating the entropy of
the session key while BLE inherits the entropy of the session
key from the entropy of the long term key.
BT and BLE support a “Secure Connections” mode that
uses FIPS compliant security primitives such as AES-CCM
for authenticated encryption, Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) over P-256 for key agreement, mutual authentica-
tion procedures for the long term key, and AES-CMAC for
keyed hashing. BT and BLE have similar association mech-
anisms that can be used to protect the pairing phase against
man-in-the-middle attacks. Two examples of associations are
“Just Works” that provides no protection and “Numeric Com-
parison” that provides protection against man-in-the-middle
attacks by requiring user interaction (e.g., the user has to man-
ually confirm that she sees the same numeric code on the
pairing devices).
BT and BLE define master and slave roles in different ways.
For BT, the master is the connection initiator, the slave is the
connection responder, and roles can be switched. Both master
or slave can request a role switch almost anytime after a radio
link between the two is established. For BLE, master and
slave roles are fixed and switching roles is not supported. The
master acts as the connection initiator (BLE central) and the
slave as the connection responder (BLE peripheral). High-end
BLE devices, such as laptops and smartphones, implement
both master and slave modes and are typically used as the
master, while low-end devices, such as fitness trackers or
smartwatches, implement only the slave mode.
2.2 Cross-Transport Key Derivation (CTKD)
Two devices that support BT and BLE have to pair over BT
and over BLE to use both transports securely. Pairing the
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Figure 1: CTKD overview. CTKD is used by two devices
who paired and share a long term key over BLE to derive a
long term key for BT. CTKD can also be used to derive BLE
pairing keys after two devices paired over BT.
same two devices twice is not user-friendly and the Bluetooth
standard addressed this issue in Bluetooth 4.2 (released in
2014) by introducing CTKD. As shown in Figure 1, CTKD
enables two devices to pair once, either over BT or BLE, and
then securely use both [12, p. 280]. For example, a user can
pair a headset and a laptop over BLE, without putting the
headset in BT discoverable mode, and then securely connect
the headset and the laptop over BT (without having to pair
over BT). It is also possible to do the initial pairing over BT,
and use CTKD to generate the BLE pairing key.
Before explaining how CTKD works, it is important to
review the differences between pairable (bondable) and dis-
coverable states for BT and BLE. If a device is pairable then
it will accept pairing with other devices, while if it is discov-
erable it will reveal its identity to other devices. Contrary to
popular belief, a device is not required to be both discoverable
and pairable for pairing but it only needs to be in a pairable
state. For example, when pairing a laptop with headphones
over BT, typically only the headphones are discoverable and
pairable while the laptop is only pairable. Hence, it is possible
to pair with a device even if it is not discoverable [41].
The Bluetooth standard specifies the same CTKD function
to derive BT and BLE long term keys. This function takes
as inputs a 128-bit (16-byte) key and two 4-byte strings and
derives a 128-bit (16-byte) key using AES-CMAC (see Sec-
tion 5.4 for CTKD’s internals). CTKD for BT derives a BLE
long term key (KBLE) from a BT long term key (KBT) and
the strings "tmp2" and "brle", while CTKD for BLE derives
KBT from KBLE and the strings "tmp1" and "lebr". As the
standard defines constant strings and no fresh nonces as in-
puts, the CTKD function derives the same output key when
reusing the same input key.
CTKD is widely supported by vendors such as Apple [42],
Google [5], Cypress [15], Linux [14], Qualcomm [33], and In-
tel [23]. CTKD is used in combination with “Secure Connec-
tions”, that is a security mode that was introduced to enhance
the security primitives of BT and BLE without affecting their
security mechanisms. For example, “Secure Connections” in-
troduced AES-CCM authenticated-encryption for BT, and
ECDH pairing for BLE.
3 Security Analysis of CTKD
To analyse the security of CTKD we introduce our system
and attacker models before describing how CTKD is used in
a non adversarial setting. We then introduce the significant
security issues we discovered with CTKD. These security
issues are then exploited by our attacks in Section 4.
3.1 System Model
Our system model considers two victims, Alice and Bob, who
want to securely communicate over BT and BLE. Alice and
Bob support CTKD and during pairing and session establish-
ment propose the strongest security mechanisms (e.g., Secure
Simple Pairing (SSP), “Secure Connections”, and “Numeric
Comparison”). Such mechanisms are expected to protect Al-
ice and Bob against impersonation, eavesdropping, and man-
in-the-middle attacks on BT and BLE. Alice and Bob can
run secure sessions both over BT and BLE. Without loss of
generality, we assume that Alice is the BT and BLE master
and Bob is the BT and BLE slave.
Regarding the notation, we indicate a BT pairing key with
KBT, a BT session key with SKBT, a BLE pairing key with
KBLE, and a BLE session key with SKBLE. We indicate a
Bluetooth address with ADD. Furthermore, we indicate a
public key with PK, a private key with SK, a shared Diffie-
Hellman secret with DK, a nonce with N, and a message
authentication code with MAC.
3.2 Attacker Model and Goals
Our attacker model considers Charlie, a remote attacker in
Bluetooth range with Alice and Bob. The attacker aims to
compromise the secure BT and BLE sessions between the
victims. The attacker’s knowledge is limited to what Alice
and Bob advertise over the air, e.g., full or partial Bluetooth
addresses, Bluetooth names, authentication requirements, IO
capabilities, and device classes. The attacker does not know
long term keys or session keys shared between Alice and Bob
and does not observe Alice and Bob when they pair or estab-
lish a secure session. Regarding the attacker’s capabilities,
the attacker can scan and discover BT and BLE devices, jam
the Bluetooth spectrum, pair over BT and BLE using CTKD,
propose weak association mechanisms (e.g., “Just Works”),
and dissect and craft unencrypted Bluetooth packets.
The attacker has four goals. The first goal is to impersonate
Alice (to Bob) and take over Alice’s secure sessions. The
second goal is to impersonate Bob (to Alice) and take over
Bob’s secure sessions. Master and slave impersonations are
two different goals as they require different attack strategies.
The third goal is to establish a man-in-the-middle position in a
secure session between Alice and Bob. The third goal requires
combining and synchronizing the impersonation attacks on
Alice and Bob. The fourth goal is to pair and establish un-
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intended sessions with Alice or Bob as an arbitrary device,
without breaking existing pairings and secure sessions.
3.3 CTKD Life Cycle
In this section, we show CTKD’s life cycle in a non-
adversarial setting using Figure 2 as a reference. In the next
section, we describe its associated issues. The first phase of
CTKD’s life cycle is Discovery, where Alice and Bob find
each other and exchange their capabilities (e.g., Alice scans
and Bob advertises his presence). The Bluetooth standard
does not include an explicit feature to initiate CTKD. Instead,
Alice and Bob declare BT, BLE, SSP, and Secure Connections
support to implicitly initiate CTKD.
After Discovery, Alice and Bob initiate Pairing, CTKD life
cycle’s second phase. Pairing happens either over BT or BLE
according to the use case. As part of pairing Alice and Bob
negotiate a pairing key (e.g., KBLE or KBT) using ECDH. The
pairing key is derived from the shared Diffie-Hellman secret,
the Bluetooth addresses of Alice and Bob, and fresh nonces.
Then, they complete the association phase (e.g., compare a
numeric sequence on Alice and Bob’s screens to prevent man-
in-the-middle attacks). Finally, Alice and Bob run CTKD
to derive a second pairing key for the other transport from
the first pairing key (e.g., derive KBT from KBLE). CTKD is
deterministic as it uses the pairing key and constant strings
as input to a key derivation function and does not require
exchanging any message or acknowledgment between Alice
and Bob.
Once Alice and Bob complete Pairing they start Commu-
nication, CTKD life cycle’s third phase, where they can es-
tablish secure sessions over BT and/or BLE by using their
shared pairing keys. Each session derives a fresh session key
from the long term pairing key, is optionally authenticated
using the pairing key, and uses the session key to encrypt and
integrity protect the Bluetooth packets with AES-CCM.
Figure 2: CTKD’s life cycle has three phases: Discovery
(to exchange features), Pairing (to agree on a pairing key
and, through CTKD, create a pairing key for the other trans-
port), and Communication (to establish secure sessions on BT
and/or BLE).
CTI Name Phase Summary
1 Roles Discovery Role asymmetries
2 Sec. Conn. Discovery No Secure Connections
3 Association Pairing No uniform association
4 Key Overw. Pairing Overwrite pairing keys
5 States Comm. Pairable over BT and BLE
Table 1: Cross-transport issues (CTIs) with CTKD. SC ab-
breviates Secure Connections and KO abbreviates Key Over-
write.
3.4 Cross-Transport Issues with CTKD
We believe that CTKD is an interesting attack surface, for
several reasons. CTKD crosses the security boundary between
BT and BLE. Therefore, a CTKD vulnerability is exploitable
for both BT and BLE. As CTKD bridges BT and BLE, an
attacker can exploit known vulnerabilities on BT to exploit
BLE and vice versa. As CTKD is an optional feature and is
transparent to the user, an attack exploiting CTKD is hard to
detect. As CTKD requires Secure Connections support, an
attacker can break the most secure BT and BLE modes by
targeting CTKD.
Despite the listed reasons, the Bluetooth standard does not
provide a security analysis of CTKD and does not include
CTKD in the BT and BLE threat models [12, p. 1401]. As a
result, CTKD remains an unexplored attack surface and in this
work, we address this concern by performing the first security
analysis of CTKD. Our analysis uncovers five cross-transport
issues (summarized in Table 1). We now describe each issue
in detail by using the CTKD life cycle phases presented in
Section 3.3.
CTI 1: Roles (Discovery) During Discovery, Alice and
Bob can discover each other and trigger Pairing both over
BT and BLE. This is a consequence of CTKD as it enables
more ways to pair devices with less user interaction. Alice, as
master, is expected to send pairing requests over BT or BLE
to Bob, and the user expects to pair Alice and Bob by discov-
ering Bob on Alice’s screen and sending a pairing request
to Bob. However, BT master and slave roles are not fixed
(unlike BLE) and Alice can receive pairing requests over BT.
The attacker can take advantage of this role asymmetry to
impersonate a slave device that is already trusted by Alice
and send a pairing request to Alice over BT even if Alice is
expecting to receive only BT and BLE pairing responses.
CTI 2: Secure Connections (Discovery) During Discov-
ery, Alice and Bob exchange their capabilities before starting
the pairing process. To use CTKD they declare “Secure Con-
nections” support for the transport used for pairing. However,
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the specification does not specify if CTKD support requires
“Secure Connections” support only for the pairing transport
or for both transports. From our experiments, we find that
CTKD is used when “Secure Connections” is only supported
by the pairing transport. This issue considerably increases the
CTKD attack surface, as an attacker is not limited to target
only devices which support BLE and BT “Secure Connec-
tions” but can also target devices that support BLE or BT
“Secure Connections”.
CTI 3: Association (Pairing) During Pairing, Alice and
Bob can pair either over BT or BLE. While BT and BLE pair-
ings use different protocols they both include an association
phase. The issue is that CTKD does not enforce the chosen
association mechanism across BT and BLE. This issue can
be exploited by the attacker to pair with a weak association
mechanism, such as “Just Works”, on one transport while
the other transport expects a strong association mechanism,
such as “Numeric Comparison”. This is especially dangerous
in case of impersonation attacks because the user is not go-
ing to notice an attacker that is re-pairing using “Just Works”
pretending to be a trusted device.
CTI 4: Key Overwrite (Pairing) During Pairing Alice and
Bob use CTKD to derive a second pairing term key for the
transport not used for pairing. If Alice and Bob already shared
a long term key for such transport CTKD will overwrite the
existing pairing key. This is an issue because an attacker
who is impersonating either Alice or Bob can use CTKD to
overwrite long term keys. For example, if Alice and Bob are
running a secure session over BT then the attacker can pair
with Bob over BLE while impersonating Alice and overwrite
the BT key that is shared by Alice and Bob.
CTI 5: States (Communication) During Communication
Alice and Bob establish secure sessions over BT and/or BLE.
In our experiments, we observed that Alice and Bob remain
pairable over BT and BLE. Bob also remains discoverable
over BLE. This is not the case without CTKD where a device
is pairable and optionally discoverable only on one transport.
This issue gives the attacker more options to discover and
pair with victim devices. For example, the attacker can pair
on the transport that is not currently in use by Alice and
Bob. Furthermore, in some CTKD use cases one transport is
supposed to be used only for pairing and deriving keys for the
other. Hence, that transport is always in a pairable state but
never used after pairing. This enables the attacker to establish
unintended malicious sessions on both transports by pairing
on the unused one and forcing CTKD.
4 BLUR Attacks on CTKD
We now design four novel CTKD cross-transport attacks
based on the five cross-transport issues that we discuss in
Section 3.4. We provide the first attacks that exploit CTKD,
blurring the security boundary between BT and BLE. Our
attacks are standard-compliant and enable impersonation, in-
terception, and manipulation of traffic between victims, as
well as unintended sessions with a victim device. We call our
attacks BLUR attacks.
4.1 BLUR Impersonation Attacks
Figure 3 presents the BLUR impersonation attack strategy
Before the attack takes place Alice and Bob (the victims)
are running a secure BT session and they share a BT long
term key (KBT). As a side effect of CTKD, Alice and Bob are
pairable on BLE. Charlie (the attacker), targets BLE (which
is not used by the victims) and pairs with Bob over BLE as
Alice and triggers CTKD, while the real Alice is communi-
cating with Bob over BT. Because of CTKD, Charlie forces
Bob to overwrite the BT pairing key that he established with
Alice with his own. As a result, Charlie takes over Alice’s BT
session from BLE. The real Alice can no longer connect to
Bob as she does not possess the correct KBT and can attempt
to re-pair with Bob only when Charlie terminates his BT ses-
sion with Bob. Charlie uses the described attack strategy to
perform master and slave impersonation attacks as follows:
Master impersonation Charlie impersonates Alice (mas-
ter) and takes over her BT secure session with Bob as in Fig-
ure 4. Charlie discovers Bob as he is pairable over BLE and
sends a BLE pairing request using Alice’s Bluetooth address
(ADDA), Secure Connections support (to trigger CTKD), and
“Just Works” association to avoid user interaction. Charlie’s
BLE pairing request does not collide with the BT traffic ex-
changed by Alice and Bob as BT and BLE use different phys-
Figure 3: BLUR impersonation attack strategy. Charlie pairs
with Bob over one transport (e.g., BLE) and (over)writes the
pairing keys for both transports, including Alice’s BT pairing
key.
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Charlie as Alice (master)
C
Bob (slave)
B
BLE Pairing Request:
Just Works, ADDA, PKC , NC
BLE Pairing Response:
ADDB , PKB, NB
DK = PKB · SKC
KBLE = kdf(DK, NC ,
NB, ADDA, ADDB)
KBT = ctkd(KBLE)
DK = PKC · SKB
KBLE = kdf(DK, NC ,
NB, ADDA, ADDB)
KBT = ctkd(KBLE)
Figure 4: Master impersonation attack and takeover. Char-
lie (acting as master) pairs with Bob over BLE, overwriting
Alice’s key.
Alice (master)
A
Charlie as Bob (slave)
C
BT Pairing Request:
Just Works, ADDB , PKC , NC
BT Pairing Response:
ADDA, PKA, NA
DK = PKA · SKC
KBT = kdf2(DK, NC ,
NA, ADDA, ADDB)
KBLE = ctkd(KBT)
DK = PKC · SKA
KBT = kdf2(DK, NC ,
NA, ADDA, ADDB)
KBLE = ctkd(KBT)
Figure 5: Slave impersonation attack and takeover. Charlie
(acting as slave) sends a BT pairing request to Alice (master)
as Bob, overwriting Bob’s key.
ical layers and link layers.
Bob sends Charlie a BLE pairing response believing that
Alice wants to pair (or repair) over BLE using CTKD. Charlie
and Bob use the exchanged public keys to compute DK. Then
they use DK and the exchanged nonces (NC, NB) to compute
KBLE. Then, they locally compute KBT from KBLE using the
CTKD’s key derivation function (ctkd). As a result of the
master impersonation attack, Charlie forces Bob to overwrite
the BT pairing key that he established with Alice with his
BT pairing key, establishes a BLE pairing key with Bob, and
takes over Alice’s BT session.
Slave impersonation Charlie impersonates Bob (slave) and
takes over his BT secure session with Alice as in Figure 5. In
this case Charlie has to wait until the secure BT session be-
CTI 1 CTI 2 CTI 3 CTI 4 CTI 5
Roles Sec. Conn. Assoc. Key Overw. States
Master Imp. x X X X X
Slave Imp. X X X X x
MitM X X X X X
Unin. Sess. x X x x X
Table 2: The mapping between the five cross-transport issues
(CTI) identified in Section 3.4 and the four BLUR attacks
discussed in Section 4.
tween Alice and Bob is interrupted (e.g., by running a master
impersonation attack against Bob). Then Charlie can exploit
role asymmetries between BT and BLE by sending a BT
pairing request to Alice who is typically expecting pairing
responses either over BT or BLE. Charlie’s pairing request
include Secure Connections support (to trigger CTKD), Bob’s
Bluetooth address (ADDB) and “Just Works” association to
avoid user interaction.
Alice, who is pairable over BT, sends a BT pairing response
believing that Bob wants to repair over BT using CTKD.
Charlie and Alice use the exchanged public keys to compute
DK. Then they use DK and the exchanged nonces to derive
KBT(kdf2). Then they locally derive KBLE from KBT using
CTKD’s key derivation functions (ctkd). As a result of the
slave impersonation attack, Charlie forces Alice to overwrite
the BT pairing key that she established with Bob with his BT
key, shares a BLE key with Alice, and takes over Bob’s BT
session. Bob cannot re-establish secure sessions with Alice
as he does no longer possess the correct pairing keys.
As summarized in Table 2, the master impersonation at-
tack takes advantage of all the cross-transport issues that we
present in Section 3.4 except CTI 1. In particular, the attacker
takes advantage of non-consistent “Secure Connections” sup-
port (CTI 2), lack of consistency between BT and BLE asso-
ciation methods (CTI 3), more opportunities to pair (CTI 5),
and key overwriting (CTI 4). The slave impersonation attack
takes advantage of all CTIs except CTI 5, including the role
asymmetries between BT and BLE (CTI 1).
Figure 6: BLUR man-in-the-middle attack. The attacker uses
the BLUR Impersonation attack against two devices that were
previously paired. The two devices do not detect a change but
Charlie now has access to all traffic.
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Alice (master)
A
Charlie (MitM)
C
Bob (slave)
B
Alice and Bob share KBT (BT pairing key)
Impersonation attack as Alice over BLE
KBT overwrit-
ten via CTKD
with KBC
Impersonation attack as Bob over BT
KBT overwrit-
ten via CTKD
with KAC
NA NA
NB ,MACKBC (NA, NB ,ADDA,ADDB)NB ,MACKAC (NA, NB ,ADDA,ADDB)
MACKAC (NA, NB ,ADDA,ADDB) MACKBC (NA, NB ,ADDA,ADDB)
BT session between Alice and Bob with Charlie in the middle
Figure 7: MitM attack and takeover. Charlie impersonates
Alice as in Figure 4, impersonates Bob as in Figure 5, let the
victims mutually authenticate and then gets access to their
traffic.
4.2 BLUR Man-in-the-Middle Attack
Figure 6 presents the high-level description of our BLUR man-
in-the-middle attack. As in the previous section, Alice and
Bob are paired over BT and they run a secure session over BT.
During this attack, Charlie sequentially performs the master
and slave impersonation attacks described in Section 4.1. As
a result, the attacker overwrites Alice and Bob’s BT pairing
keys with known keys, establishes BLE long term keys with
Alice and Bob, and positions himself in the middle to access
all traffic between the victims and to inject valid traffic both
on BT and BLE.
Figure 7 shows the details of the MitM attack. Firstly, Char-
lie impersonates Alice to Bob over BLE (as in Figure 4),
overwrites Bob’s BT key with his key (KBC). Secondly, Char-
lie impersonates Bob to Alice over BT as in Figure 5 and
overwrites Alice’s BT key with his key (KAC). Then, Alice
and Bob exchange two nonces (NA, NB) to authenticate the
BT pairing key. Charlie mutually authenticates with Bob and
Alice by using a message authentication code (MAC) function
keyed with the appropriate key and input parameters. Finally,
Alice and Bob establish a secure BT session with Charlie in
the middle, and Charlie gets access to all traffic exchanged
by Alice and Bob and can modify and inject arbitrary valid
traffic between Alice and Bob.
As summarized in Table 2, the BLUR man-in-the-middle
attack is a composition of the master and slave impersonation
BLUR attacks and takes advantage of all the CTI that we
present in Section 3.4.
Figure 8: BLUR unintended sessions attack. Charlie sends
a BLE pairing request to Bob (who remains pairable over
BLE due to CTKD) as an unknown device with arbitrary
capabilities. After CTKD completes, Charlie can establish
secure but unintended BT and BLE sessions with Bob without
breaking Bob’s existing pairings and sessions.
4.3 BLUR Unintended Sessions Attack
Figure 8 presents a BLUR unintended session attack targeting
Bob. In this scenario, Alice and Bob are running a secure
session over BT but they are still pairable over BLE in order
to accept pairing requests with other devices and run CTKD.
Charlie targets Bob (slave) by sending him a pairing request
over BLE as an unknown device. Charlie can pretend to be any
device having arbitrary capabilities, e.g., Bluetooth address,
Bluetooth name, device class, “Secure Connections” support,
and weak association. Bob, accepts to pair with Charlie while
continuing his session with Alice. Then, Charlie and Bob
negotiate KBLE, and derive KBT using CTKD. Now, Charlie
can establish secure but unintended BT and BLE sessions
with Bob without breaking his existing pairings or sessions
with other devices (e.g., with Alice).
Charlie can also establish unintended sessions with Alice
(master). In particular, he can impersonate a BLE slave and
start advertising his presence. Once Alice discovers Charlie,
she can establish a BLE connection with him, and Charlie
can explicitly request to pair using a SMP Security Request
packet [12, p. 1401]. Then, Alice and Charlie compute KBLE,
and derive KBT using CTKD. Now, Charlie can establish se-
cure but unintended BT and BLE sessions with Alice without
breaking her existing pairings or sessions with other devices
(e.g., with Bob). Charlie can take advantage of the unintended
sessions with Alice and Bob in many ways. For example,
he can use the session to drop known exploits such as Blue-
Borne [6], BLEEDINGBIT [7], or SweynTooth [20], new
exploits, and to enumerate and tamper with BT and BLE ser-
vices and characteristics (including the protected ones).
Those attacks are particularly effective when the victims
are using one transport only to pair and derive keys with
CTKD. For example, a Bluetooth speaker only streams music
over BT but is also pairable over BLE to enable users to
discover it without having to put it into BT pairing mode. As
summarized in Table 2 the unintended session BLUR attack
takes advantage of CTI 2 and CTI 4.
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Figure 9: BLUR Attack Scenario. Alice (master) is a
ThinkPad X1 7th gen, Bob (slave) is a pair of Sony WH-
CH700N headphones and Charlie (attacker) is a CYW920819
board connected via USB to a ThinkPad X1 3rd gen. Alice
and Bob have paired in absence of Charlie, and are running a
secure BT session.
5 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section we describe our attack scenario, our attack
device, an implementation of the BLUR attacks (proposed
in Section 4) using open-source software and off-the-shelf
hardware, an implementation of the CTKD mechanism used
to validate our attacks, and an evaluation of our attacks on
13 unique devices from different hardware and software ven-
dors. The tools that we developed will be open-sourced after
responsible disclosure with the Bluetooth SIG.
5.1 BLUR Attack Scenario
Our attack scenario is presented in Figure 9 and includes two
victims, a 7th generation ThinkPad X1 laptop (Alice, mas-
ter) and a pair of Sony WH-CH700N headphones (Bob, mas-
ter). The attacker (Charlie) uses a CYW920819 development
board [16] and a 3rd generation ThinkPad X1 laptop. As in
our attack descriptions in Section 4, the victims have securely
paired in absence of Charlie, and are running a secure BT
session. The evaluation results presented in Section 5.6 are
obtained by using the same attack scenario targeting different
victim devices.
Table 3 presents the relevant Bluetooth features supported
by Alice and Bob. We note that Bob is capable of using CTKD
over BLE even if he does not support “Secure Connections”
over BT and does not support Bluetooth version 4.2. This
confirms the “Secure Connections” cross-transport issue (CTI
2) that we discuss in Section 3.4. Table 3 also shows the
features supported by Charlie, and indicates with an asterisk
(*) the features that we can modify with our implementation
of the BLUR attacks. For example, our implementation en-
ables to send pairing requests over BT and BLE with with
arbitrary Bluetooth addresses, names, associations, “Secure
Connections” (SC) support, and authentication requirements
(AuthReq).
Alice Bob Charlie
Device(s) X1 7th gen WH-CH700N X1 3rd gen /
CYW920819
Radio Chip Intel CSR Intel / Cypress
Subversion 256 12942 256 / 8716*
Version 5.1 4.1 5.0*
Name x7 WH-CH700N x1*
ADD Redacted Redacted Redacted*
Class 0x1c010c 0x0 0x0*
BT SC True Only Controller True*
BT AuthReq 0x03 0x02 0x03*
BLE SC True True True*
BLE AuthReq 0x2d 0x09 0x2d*
CTKD True True True*
h7 True False True*
Role Master Slave Master*
IO Display No IO Display*
Association “Numeric C.” “Just Works” “Numeric C.”*
Pairable True True True*
Table 3: Relevant Bluetooth features for Alice, Bob, and Char-
lie. Alice and Bob support CTKD even if Bob’s Host does not
support BT SC (BT “Secure Connections”). We redact the
devices’ Bluetooth addresses for privacy reasons. We append
an asterisk (*) to the attacker’s features that we can modify
with our implementation.
5.2 BLUR Attack Device
Our attack device consists of a Linux laptop (Bluetooth host)
connected to a CYW920819 development board (Bluetooth
controller). We implement our attack device by developing
custom code and tools both for the Bluetooth host and the
Bluetooth controller.
Regarding the host, we modify and recompile the Linux
kernel and BlueZ according to our needs. For example, by
changing the kernel we enable parsing of diagnostic messages
from the controller, and by changing BlueZ we can develop
custom user-space management commands for BT and BLE.
Regarding the controller, we use the board’s proprietary
patching mechanism to modify the Bluetooth firmware ac-
cording to our needs. For example, by writing the firmware’s
RAM we can change the attack device’s features, including
the features containing an asterisk (*) in Table 3. This process
required significant engineering effort as we had to dump
the Bluetooth firmware from the board, reverse-engineer the
relevant functions and data structures, and write and test our
ARM assembly patches.
Our attack device makes use of several free and open-
source tools to automate the configuration and management
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Tool Usage
ghidra RE the devboard firmware [39]
internalblue Patch devboard firmware [30]
wireshark Monitor HCI, LMP, and SMP
hciconfig Configure HCI interfaces
hcitool Scan, connect and enumerate BLE devices
bleah Scan, connect and enumerate BLE devices
scapy Craft and decode packets [11]
pybt Custom BLE pairing [36]
linux414 Modify BLE pairing capabilities
bluez Modify Linux userspace configuration
pybluez Test BT and BLE using the BlueZ API
scapy Configure HCI, manage BT and BLE sockets
bluetoothctl Manage, pair and connect devices
btmgmt Manage, pair and connect devices
Table 4: Open-source tools used to implement the BLUR
attacks.
of BT, BLE, and the BLUR attacks. Table 4 presents the list
of such tools with a brief description of their usage. Overall,
our usage of low-cost hardware and open-source software
will enable other researchers to easily reproduce the BLUR
attacks.
5.3 BLUR Attacks Implementation
The BLUR attacks, presented in Section 4, include master
impersonation, slave impersonation, man-in-the-middle, and
unintentional session attacks. In the next paragraphs, we de-
scribe how we implemented them based on our attack device
in the attack scenario presented in Section 5.1.
Laptop (master) impersonation attack To impersonate
the laptop, we configure our attack device to clone the laptop
Bluetooth features, including Bluetooth address, Bluetooth
name, device class, BT and BLE “Secure Connections” sup-
port, and advertised services. We accomplish this task by
patching the attack device’s Bluetooth firmware and config-
uring the attack laptop accordingly. Once the attack device
looks like the impersonated laptop, we ask the headphones to
pair over BLE using “Just Works” and CTKD.
The malicious BLE pairing request is sent using btmgmt’s
text-based user interface (TUI). The headphones accept the
request to pair over BLE, update the BLE long term key, run
CTKD for BT, update the BT long term key, and establish a
secure BLE session with the attack device. Then, the head-
phones terminate the BT session with the impersonated laptop
and establish a secure BT session with the attack device. The
impersonated laptop cannot connect back with the headphones
as it does not possess the new BT and BLE long term keys.
Headphones (slave) impersonation attack To imperson-
ate the headphones, we configure our attack device to clone
the headphones Bluetooth features using the same technique
adopted for the laptop impersonation. Once the attack device
looks like the impersonated headphones we ask the laptop to
pair over BT using “Just Works” and CTKD. The malicious
BT pairing request is sent using btmgmt’s TUI. The laptop
accepts to pair over BT, updates the BT long term key, and
runs CTKD for BLE. Then, we establish a secure BT session
with the headphones.
Man-in-the-middle attack By using our BLUR implemen-
tation with two development boards connected to the same
attack laptop, we can impersonate the laptop and the head-
phones at the same time, and man-in-the-middle them. In
particular, we run the laptop (master) impersonation attack
first, and then the headphone (slave) impersonation attack.
As a result, the attack device positions itself in the middle
between the victims.
Unintended sessions attack To perform the unintended
sessions attacks, we configure the attack device to imperson-
ate an arbitrary device with arbitrary services over BT and
BLE. Then we send a malicious pairing request to the head-
phones over BLE and one to the laptop over BT. Both pairing
requests declare support for CTKD and “Just Works”. The
attack device establishes new BT and BLE keys both with
the headphones and the laptop and starts unintended sessions
with both over BT and BLE.
5.4 CTKD Mechanism Implementation
The Bluetooth standard does not provide a reference imple-
mentation for the key derivation function used by CTKD, and
provides limited documentation about its design [12, p. 1401].
We decided to implement it in Python 3 using the PyCA
cryptographic module [8] and we successfully tested our im-
plementation against the test vectors in the standard. We used
our implementation to validate the BT and BLE keys derived
using CTKD while performing our attacks and the code will
be open-sourced. We now describe the CTKD key derivation
function implementation details.
As explained in Section 2.2, the Bluetooth standard spec-
ifies a single CTKD function that is used with different pa-
rameters for BT and BLE. Figure 10 shows the CTKD key
derivation function for BT (top) and BLE (bottom). Both use
a chain of two AES-CMAC blocks in sequence with different
keys and 4-byte constant strings. AES-CMAC is a message au-
thentication code (MAC) based on the AES block cipher [18].
In particular, BT uses KBT, "tmp2" and "brle" and derives
KBLE, while BLE uses KBLE, "tmp1" and "lebr" and derives
KBT.
In the first AES-CMAC, if both devices support the h7 con-
version function in the Bluetooth standard [12, p. 1634], the
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long term key is used as key and the string as input, otherwise,
the string (padded with 12 zeros) is used as key and the long
term key as input. In the second AES-CMAC, the 128-bit
(16-byte) output of the first AES-CMAC is used as key and
the string as input. The 128-bit (16-byte) output of the second
AES-CMAC is the derived long term key.
5.5 BLUR Attacks Evaluation Setup
With our attack implementation (Section 5.3), we are capable
of conducting all four BLUR attacks. We used the attack
device both as the attacker and as one of the victims. For
example, in a master impersonation attack we pair the attack
device with the slave victim device, we disconnect them, we
“forget” the victim device on the attack device and we run
the master impersonation attack from the attack device. This
setup is practical because it allows us to quickly test many
slave victims. For the slave impersonation, we use the same
procedure and quickly test many master victims.
If a victim device is vulnerable to the master or slave im-
personation attack then is also vulnerable to the man-in-the-
middle attack, as the latter requires a vulnerable master device
and a vulnerable slave device. Regarding the unintended ses-
sion attack, we test this attack by connecting the target victim
to a third device and then by trying to establish unintended ses-
sions with the victim as an arbitrary device over the transport
that is not used by the legitimate connection. For example, if
the victim is a pair of headphones that is connected with a
laptop over BT then we run the unintended session attacker
over BLE.
5.6 BLUR Attacks Evaluation Results
We evaluated the BLUR attacks on 13 devices, and Table 5
shows our evaluation results. The first six columns indicate
the device producer, device model, OS, chip manufacturer,
Figure 10: CTKD key derivation function for BT (top) and
BLE (bottom).
chip model, and supported Bluetooth version. The seventh
column indicates the attacker role. The last three columns
contain a checkmark (X) if a device is vulnerable to the
master impersonation attack (MI), slave impersonation attack
(SI), man-in-the-middle attack (MitM), or unintended session
(US) attack. The master and slave impersonation attacks are
grouped in one column (MI/SI column). If the victim’s role
is slave then we test it against a master impersonation attack,
otherwise, we test it against a slave impersonation attack. As
shown by the last three columns, all the 13 devices (10 unique
Bluetooth chips) that we tested are vulnerable to the relevant
BLUR attacks.
Our list of vulnerable devices is from a broad set of device
producers (Samsung, Dell, Google, Lenovo, and Sony), operat-
ing system producers (Android, Windows, Linux, and propri-
etary OSes), and Bluetooth chip producers (Broadcom, CSR,
Cypress, Intel, Qualcomm, and Samsung). Our evaluation
demonstrates that the BLUR attacks are practical, standard-
compliant, and affects all the Bluetooth versions that support
CTKD (i.e., Bluetooth versions ≥ 4.2). As the BLUR attacks
are standard-compliant, potentially all standard-compliant de-
vices supporting CTKD are also vulnerable. Based on our
evaluation, we suggest that the Bluetooth SIG fix the issues
that we uncover in CTKD and we provide our set of counter-
measures for the Bluetooth standard in Section 6.2.
6 Discussion
We now discuss the lessons learned, and our set of counter-
measures to mitigate the BLUR attacks.
6.1 Lessons Learned
There are several lessons that we learned while analyzing
CTKD and developing the BLUR attacks. In this section we
report those lessons as they are useful for protocol design-
ers who are dealing with cross-transport features and related
security issues.
Cross-transport security mechanisms need a cross-
transport threat model Features that cross the security
boundary between two technologies with different threat mod-
els should be designed with a cross-transport threat model
in mind. This is not the case for CTKD, as the Bluetooth
standard does not include in its threat model an attacker who
is capable of performing cross-transport attacks, e.g., exploit
a weak security mechanism on one transport to evade a strong
and expected security mechanism on the other. Without a
cross-transport threat model you cannot detect cross-transport
vulnerabilities and related attacks.
Similar security mechanisms with different threat mod-
els do not provide the same security guarantees BT and
10
Device Chip Bluetooth BLUR Attack
Producer Model OS Producer Model Version Role MI/SI MitM US
Cypress CYW920819EVB-02 Proprietary Cypress CYW20819 5.0 Slave X X X
Dell Latitude 7390 Win 10 PRO Intel 8265 4.2 Slave X X X
Google Pixel 2 Android Qualcomm SDM835 5.0 Slave X X X
Lenovo X1 (3rd gen) Linux Intel 7265 4.2 Slave X X X
Lenovo X1 (7th gen) Linux Intel 9560 5.1 Slave X X X
Samsung Galaxy A40 Android Samsung Exynos 7904 5.0 Slave X X X
Samsung Galaxy A51 Android Samsung Exynos 9611 5.0 Slave X X X
Samsung Galaxy A90 Android Qualcomm SDM855 5.0 Slave X X X
Samsung Galaxy S10 Android Broadcom BCM4375 5.0 Slave X X X
Samsung Galaxy S10e Android Broadcom BCM4375 5.0 Slave X X X
Samsung Galaxy S20 Android Broadcom BCM4375 5.0 Slave X X X
Sony WH-1000XM3 Proprietary CSR 12414 4.2 Master X X X
Sony WH-CH700N Proprietary CSR 12942 4.1 Master X X X
Table 5: BLUR attacks evaluation results. The last three columns contain a checkmark (X) if a device is vulnerable to the master
impersonation attack (MI), slave impersonation attack (SI), man-in-the-middle attack (MitM), or unintended session (US) attack.
If the victim’s role is slave then we test the victim against a master impersonation attack (Role = Master), otherwise, we test it
against a slave impersonation attack (Role = Slave), and we group the attacks in one column (MI/SI column). As shown by the
last three columns, all the tested 13 devices (10 unique Bluetooth chips) are vulnerable to the relevant BLUR attacks.
BLE both provide their version of pairing and secure session
establishment. One might think that pairing over BT and then
establishing a secure session over BLE provides the same
security guarantees of pairing over BT and establishing a se-
cure session over BLE or pairing and establishing a secure
session using the same transport. However, this is not the case
and mixing those mechanisms results in new cross-transport
attack vectors.
Properly weighting usability against security benefits is
key CTKD was introduced to improve BT and BLE usabil-
ity. In light of the presented issues and attacks we learned that
the usability benefits introduced with CTKD are not balanc-
ing the security issues introduced by CTKD. We agree that
no-one wants to use complicated security mechanisms, but
the Bluetooth standard should have introduced a secure and
usable CTKD mechanism.
6.2 Countermeasures
We now present a set of countermeasures to address all the
five CTI presented in Section 3.4. Our countermeasures can
be implemented in the Bluetooth Host (device OS), by storing
and checking extra metadata about a trusted Bluetooth device.
Align BT and BLE roles (CTI 1) The BLUR attacks take
advantage of BT and BLE role asymmetries to act as a BT
master while being a BLE slave. To fix this issue, a device
should store the (fixed) BLE role of the remote device at the
time of pairing and enforce it for BT.
Enforce Secure Connections (CTI 2) In our experiments,
we can use CTKD with the WH-CH700N headphones even if
they only support “Secure Connections” for BLE. This should
not happen as CTKD should be used only when “Secure
Connections” is supported on both BT and BLE. To fix this
issue, a device should enforce that “Secure Connections” is
supported on BT and BLE before running CTKD and raise
an error if this is not the case.
Enforce strong association mechanisms (CTI 3) BT and
BLE do not protect the negotiation of the association mecha-
nism and CTKD allows two devices to use different associ-
ation mechanisms on different transports when pairing and
re-pairing. The BLUR attack exploits this fact to re-pair with
a victim device using “Just Works” even if the victim supports
“Numeric Comparison”. To fix this issue, a device should keep
track of which BT and BLE keys are established using CTKD,
record the strongest association mechanism used while pair-
ing and enforce it for subsequent (re-)pairings.
Disable CTKD key overwrites (CTI 4) CTKD allows
(over)writing BT long term keys from BLE and vice versa.
This enables an attacker to impersonate a device and take over
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her existing session on one transport by attacking the other.
To fix this issue, a device should disallow key overwrites with
CTKD when a paired device wants to re-pair. For example,
re-pairing over BT should not overwrite a BLE long term
key that was securely established in the past. When a device
has lost a long term key for a transport (e.g., device reset), it
should explicitly re-pair on that transport.
Disable pairing when not needed (CTI 5) In our experi-
ment we confirmed that a device might remain pairable over
BT and BLE even after it has paired with a device. This im-
proves the user experience (i.e., the user does not have to put a
device in pairing mode) but increases the attack surface. To fix
this issue a device should automatically stop being pairable
on a transport that is not currently in use. For example, a pair
of headphones who are running a secure session over BT with
a laptop as an audio sink should not be pairable over BLE.
7 Related Work
Bluetooth standard compliant attacks are particularly dan-
gerous as all Bluetooth devices are affected, regardless of
version numbers or implementation details. Such standard-
compliant attacks have appeared since the first versions of
Bluetooth [24, 29]. Standard-compliant attacks on BT in-
clude attacks on legacy pairing [37], secure simple pairing
(SSP) [10, 21, 38], Bluetooth association [22], key negotia-
tion [1], and authentication procedures [3, 28, 40]. Standard-
compliant attacks on BLE include attacks on legacy pair-
ing [35], key negotiation [4], SSP [10], and GATT [25] Com-
pared to the mentioned attacks that target either BT or BLE,
the BLUR attacks are the first standard-compliant attacks
targeting the intersection between BT and BLE.
We have seen attacks targeting specific implementation
flaws on BT [6] and BLE [7, 20]. As our BLUR attacks target
the specification level, they are effective regardless of the im-
plementation details. Several surveys on BT and BLE security
were published [17, 31, 32] but none of those surveys (and
the Bluetooth standard) is considering CTKD as a threat. We
here demonstrate that CTKD is a serious threat and must be
included in the threat model.
Cross-transport attacks were exploited for proximity tech-
nologies using Bluetooth and Wi-FI. Two prominent examples
are attacks on Apple ZeroConf [9] and Google Nearby Con-
nections [2]. Our BLUR attacks are the first cross-transport
attacks for BT and BLE.
The cryptographic primitives used by Bluetooth have been
extensively analyzed. For example, the E0 cipher used by
BT was investigated [19] and it is considered relatively
weak [32]. SAFER+, used for authentication, was analyzed
as well [27]. BT and BLE “Secure Connections” use the
AES-CCM authenticated-encryption cipher. AES-CCM was
extensively analyzed [26, 34] and it is FIPS compliant. Our
BLUR attacks target key negotiation and not cryptographic
primitives, and are effective even with perfectly secure cryp-
tographic primitives.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we present the first security analyses of CTKD
and identify cross-transport issues and attacks against BT and
BLE. CTKD enables an attacker to cross the security bound-
ary between BT and BLE. These wireless transports have
different security architectures and threat models. Despite
this fact, the Bluetooth standard does not include CTKD in
the BT and BLE threat models and the security implications
of CTKD are not well understood.
We identify five cross-transport issues related to roles, “Se-
cure Connections”, association, device states, and key over-
write. Using the issues, we design and implement novel cross-
transport attacks against BT and BLE enabling impersonation,
traffic manipulation, and malicious session establishment. Our
standard-compliant attacks exploit BT and BLE just by tar-
geting one of the two. We name our attacks BLUR attacks as
they blur the security boundary between BT and BLE.
We provide and discuss a low-cost implementation of the
BLUR attacks using off-the-shelf hardware and open-source
software. To demonstrate that our attacks are practical, we use
our implementation to successfully attack 13 devices from
different hardware and software manufacturers. Our devices
range across all the Bluetooth versions supporting CTKD
(version greater or equal to 4.2) and also Bluetooth 4.1. As the
BLUR attacks are standard-compliant, all devices supporting
CTKD are potentially vulnerable.
We sketch a set of countermeasures to address the BLUR
attack directly in the Bluetooth standard. The countermea-
sures require keeping additional state about paired devices.
We have disclosed our findings and our countermeasures to
the Bluetooth SIG in May 2020.
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